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Abstract—Performance/security trade-off is widely noticed in
CFI research, however, we observe that not every CFI scheme
is subject to the trade-off. Motivated by the key observation, we
ask three questions. Although the three questions probably cannot
be directly answered, they are inspiring. We find that a deeper
understanding of the nature of the trade-off will help answer the
three questions. Accordingly, we proposed the GPT conjecture to
pinpoint the trade-off in designing CFI schemes, which says that
at most two out of three properties (fine granularity, acceptable
performance, and preventive protection) could be achieved.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Along with the increased complexity of software, it be-
comes harder for the developers to ensure execution correct-
ness in their software products, especially in those developed
by the low-level programming languages, such as C/C++. A
substantial amount of execution in-correctness is caused by
the exploitation of software vulnerabilities in the real world.
Softwares inevitably contain a wide variety of vulnerabilities,
opening a window for attacks to compromise the system.
Attackers have developed a series of attack methods, such
as shellcode injection[1], return-to-libc[2], ROP[3] and so on,
to exploit all kinds of vulnerabilities, e.g., buffer overflow,
format string, use-after-free, and so on [4]. Among all kinds of
attacks, the control-flow hijacking attack is the most dangerous
one, because it allows the attacker to control the program’s
execution, execute arbitrary malicious code and attain Turing-
complete operation[3]. To mitigate the threats, many defense
mechanisms, such as stack smashing protector (SSP)[5], ad-
dress space layout randomization (ASLR)[6], data execution
prevention (DEP)[7] and so on, have been put forward by
researchers and applied in the real world software products.
Among all the defense techniques, security schemes based
on the concept of control-flow integrity (CFI) have attracted
many researchers’ attention because of its simplicity to imple-
ment, effectiveness to cope with the full spectrum of control-
flow hijacking attacks, and flexibility to trade between security
and efficiency. CFI schemes guarantee the correctness of the
program by dynamically checking the control-flow transfer and
confining the target address to a legal set.
Since CFI was introduced by Abadi et al. in 2005 [8],
many researchers afterward were dedicated to enhance its
runtime performance, security, scalability, compatibility and
so on. According to mainstream taxonomy, most CFI schemes
can be clarified into two categories: fine-grained CFI schemes
that provide more security guarantee, and coarse-grained CFI
schemes that attain higher runtime performance. However, both
fine-grained and coarse-grained CFI schemes have noticeable
limitations that have not been addressed yet. As shown in
previous survey papers [9], lightweight CFI schemes can not
fully prevent sophisticated code reuse attack. The adversarys
attacking strategy is to search large gadgets chain whose start-
ing addresses are allowed in a rough control-flow graph that
coarse-grained CFI schemes adopted [10], [11]. Precise CFI
schemes usually suffer from unacceptable runtime overhead.
Hence, it is widely believed “performance/security trade-off”
exists between runtime overhead and security in different CFI
schemes [9], [12].
However, we observe that not every CFI scheme is subject
to the trade-off between performance and security. In fact,
several CFI schemes are “immunized” from doing such a trade-
off. For instance, piCFI designed by Niu et al. achieves fine-
grained security with a runtime overhead of 3.2% on average,
which is fairly low and acceptable [13]. Victor et al. proposed
a context-sensitive CFI scheme that achieves stronger security
than conventional fine-grained ones with an overhead of less
than some of the coarse-grained ones [14].
Key Observation. The trade-off between performance and
security does not universally exist in meaningful CFI schemes.
This intriguing observation motivates us to ask three questions:
➊ does trade-off really exist in different CFI schemes? ➋ if
trade-off do exist, How do previous works comply with it? ➌
how can it inspire future research?
Although the questions probably cannot be directly an-
swered, they are inspiring. On the other hand, we find that
a deeper understanding of the nature of the trade-off will
help answer these questions. Accordingly, we propose the
GPT conjecture to pinpoint general trade-offs in CFI schemes:
the impossibility of guaranteeing both fine granularity and
acceptable performance in a Just-In-Time CFI scheme. We
analyze its rationality through empirical study—surveying a
series of representative CFI schemes and showing how existing
CFI schemes comply with our conjecture. Finally, we give
some recommendations for future researchers. We believe
that our conjecture will help researchers have a more clear
understanding of internal relations among properties of CFI
schemes, thereby, motivating future research in this area.
II. BACKGROUND
When compiling source code written by low-level language
(such as C or C++) into machine code, the compiler emits
control data [15] (data that are loaded to processor program
counter at some point in program execution, e.g., return
addresses and function pointers) into the binary file without
any protection. The security of control data depends on checks
inserted by the programmer to enforce memory safety [16].
Along with program execution, attacker’s malicious tampering
with control data through software vulnerabilities, such as
buffer overflow, can transfer the program’s control-flow to any
executable address in process space.
Based on this observation, researchers invented CFI to
protect programs against control-flow hijacking attacks by
checking programs’ control data before loading them into the
program counter (EIP/RIP register in x86/x64 architecture).
CFI’s strategy is to restrict the control-flow of a program
to a pre-calculated CFG by checking indirect control-flow
transfers at runtime [9]. Generally, most of CFI schemes follow
a mainstream that consists of two phases.
In phase one, an analyzer statically computes the program’s
control-flow graph (CFG). CFG is a representation in graph
form of all legitimate control-flow transfers (also being called
branch) in program space. It consists of sets of nodes and
directed edges. Each node and edge denotes a basic block and a
valid branch in the program respectively. For a comprehensive
understanding, we refer the reader to the formal definition of
CFG in work by Allen, et al. [17].
In phase two, a runtime control-flow checking (validation)
component validates just fetched control data before each
indirect-branching according to the legitimate CFG generated
in phase one 1. An indirect-branch can pass checking only if it
can be matched to a corresponding edge in the CFG. A failed
validation will result in the process to terminate its execution
and report an error. In such a fashion, control-flow attacks
which usually introduce out-of-range branch are extremely
prohibited. Researchers need to design efficient data structures
to represent the CFG and enable runtime checking.
Despite its straightforward main idea, it is pretty chal-
lenging to design a CFI scheme with strong security, ac-
ceptable performance, high compatibility and so on [12], [9].
Researchers have designed hundreds of CFI schemes to explore
its potential in different perspectives. The dominant difference
of these various CFI schemes can be summarized into three
aspects: 1) the precision of a CFG they employed. 2) the
algorithm they designed to check indirect-branches. 3) the time
point checking algorithm was activated.
1) Precision of CFG Analyzer: CFG can be obtained by
analyzing the program’s source code or binary code. Like
pointer analysis [18], perfect CFG generation is can not be
fully achieved yet in many situations [10]. By now researchers
have adopted several types of methods (insensitive analysis,
context-sensitive analysis, and path-sensitive analysis) in their
CFG analyzer and achieve different precisions. It is widely
agreed that path-sensitive analysis is more precise than context-
1Direct control-flow transfers do not load any control data, their target
addresses/offsets are hard-coded in their instructions.
sensitive analysis, and context-sensitive analysis is more pre-
cise than insensitive analysis [19].
2) Algorithm to Enforce Checking: The efficiency of dif-
ferent CFI schemes is largely dependent on their algorithms
to enforce validation, which is tightly combined with their
data structure that represents the CFG and enables runtime
checking. Researchers have designed different types of al-
gorithms and data structures in different CFI schemes. For
example, the original CFI scheme proposed by the Abadi,
et al. groups branch targets into different sets, assigns each
set with a label, and inlines labels into each jump targets,
i.e., the basic block’s in code. Based on this data structure,
“guard instructions” are emitted before each indirect-branch
instruction to compare its label with the one in target basic
block [8]. A mismatch indicates that the control data is
corrupted, then the program’s execution will be redirect to the
error handling code accordingly.
piCFI [13] and MCFI [20] by Niu, et al. adopts two ID
tables, namely Bary and Tary, to store target program’s CFG.
In essence, Bary table and Tary table are hashmaps which can
efficiently map indirect-branch points and target basic blocks
to their corresponding IDs. Specifically, the Tary table is an
array of IDs indexed by code addresses, mapping target basic
block to their corresponding IDs. The Bary table uses a similar
design, mapping indirect-branch points to their corresponding
IDs. Two tables enable efficient ID look-ups and a indirect-
branch is checked by comparing the IDs of branch point and
target.
3) Just-In-Time Checking vs. Lazy Checking: Another dif-
ference among CFI schemes is how they schedule their check-
ing operations. Most CFI schemes check the target address be-
fore indirect-branch occurs (we define it as a Just-In-Time
checking). While, to achieve better performance, some
works log each indirect-branches at runtime and check them
by employing another accompanying thread [21], [22], [23],
[14], [22] (we define it as Lazy checking). For example,
PITTYPAT [22] enforces path-sensitive CFI by maintaining a
“shadow” execution/analyzer, running concurrently with the
protected process and checks its finished indirect-branches.
Such a non-intrusive checking does not disturb the normal
execution of the monitored process, hence achieves path-
sensitive CFI with practical runtime overhead.
III. CONJECTURE
This section aims to answer Question➊ and Question➋. We
observe that some terms, such as coase-grained/fine-grained,
have not been clearly defined. Before introducing the GPT
conjecture, let us give a more precise definition of the terms
and concepts that will be used throughout the paper. Then we
propose the GPT conjecture which helps to answer Question➊.
At last, some evidence is collected from an empirical study to
answer the Question➋.
A. Terminology
Property 1.(Granularity)
Suppose a program has n indirect branch instructions. Let
Zi
2 denote the set of valid successors (basic blocks) of the
2It is computed through mainstream insensitive control flow analysis. We
admit the inaccuracy due to the difficulty of the pointer analysis.
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i-th indirect branch instruction, and S denote the set of all
successor sets, namely,
S = {Zi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} (1)
For a CFI scheme, let Ci denote the checking set which is
defined by the scheme and assigned to the i-th indirect branch
instruction, then used to check the branch’s target at runtime.
Only the elements in Ci are valid successors authorized by the
CFI schemes that the i-th branch instruction could jump to.
Definition 1. For arbitrary two sets Zi, Zj from S,
satisfying Zi ∩Zj 6= ∅∨Zi 6= Zj , as long as the CFI scheme
merges Zi, Zj when define its Ci or Cj , namely,
Zi ∪ Zj ∈ Ci ∨ Zi ∪ Zj ∈ Cj (2)
we define this scheme as a coase-grained CFI
scheme. Otherwise, we define it as a fine-grained
CFI scheme. This definition enables us to determinate the
granularity property of CFI schemes.
REMARK 1. According to Definition 1, both context-
sensitive and path-sensitive CFI schemes belong to
fine-grained CFI scheme. In essence, they reduce
the size of their checking set Ci for i ∈ [1, n] based on
context-sensitive or path-sensitive pointer analysis. Their
protection is generally considered to be more powerful than
that of insensitive fine-grained CFI scheme.
REMARK 2. Note that CFI schemes [24], [25] which
adopt pointer encryption approach should be classified as
coase-grained CFI scheme. They cannot fully prevent
code reuse attack because of two noticeable drawbacks. As
discussed in Cryptographically Enforced Control Flow In-
tegrity (CCFI) [24], it is still possible to replace the current
encrypted pointer with another one from the program space
and potentially disrupt control flow. The other drawback is
that these schemes suffer from key leakage issues: the key can
be infered by brute-force attack or known-plaintext attack [26],
especially for schemes which adopt a linear encryption/decryp-
tion method (XOR) [25].
REMARK 3. We remark that schemes that only provide par-
tial protection—protecting subset of indirect branches in pro-
gram space—belong to coase-grained CFI scheme.
For instance, vfGuard [27], VTV [28], and SAFEDIS-
PATCH [29] only achieve strict protection for virtual function
calls in COTS binaries;
Property 2.(Performance)
Evidence 1. As discussed in many papers [4], [9], [30],
runtime performance is one of the most important determinants
of whether a defense technique will be adopted by industry.
Generally, to get adopted by industry, a defense technique
should introduce less than 5% average overhead, such as
StackGurad, ASLR, and DEP. Techniques incuring an over-
head larger than 10% do not tend to gain wide adoption in
production environments. Accordingly, the threshold should lie
between 5%-10%.
Evidence 2. Other than runtime performance, space per-
formance is another important index to measure a scheme. Pro-
gram’s runtime memory consumption consists of four aspects,
i.e., code, global data, heap, and stack. Different programs
have different ratios in four aspects, and a defense technique
commonly increases memory consumption in one or more
aspects. We observe that shadow based protections like shadow
stack [31], shadow memory [32] and shadow processing [33],
that double memory consumption in one or more aspects are
unlikely to be deployed in practice.
Definition 2. Conservatively, we define a runtime
overhead of less than 10% and a space overhead of
less than 100% (in any of aforementioned four aspects)
as an acceptable performance. Otherwise, it is an
unacceptable performance. This definition enables us
to determinate the performance property of CFI schemes.
Property 3.(Timeliness)
Observation 1. Whereas the term “integrity” in the context
of CFI implies that it can prevent the attacks [8], some of the
CFI schemes do not hit the mark. To achieve higher efficiency,
some CFI schemes as mentioned in Section II-3 adopted
a lazy checking mechanism, which checks programs’
control-flow following the programs execution rather than be-
fore each indirect branching. Generally, they log the program’s
runtime control-flow transfer along with its execution, then
check the control-flow offline or through an accompanying
thread. In these designs, a sliding window exists between the
program’s control-flow transfer and checking. The attacker can
compromise the system without being perceived in the sliding
window, which means this kind of CFI cannot protect software
against such attacks.
Definition 3. We regard that the aforementioned de-
sign of CFI schemes provides less protection than CFI
schemes that perform Just-In-Time checking. We de-
fine protection capability powered by lazy checking
schemes as detective protection, the others that
powered by Just-In-Time checking as preventive
protection. This definition enables us to determinate the
property timeliness of CFI schemes.
B. The Proposed Conjecture
GPT Conjecture: A control-flow integrity scheme
can have at most two out of three properties:
P1. Fine granularity
P2. Acceptable performance
P3. Preventive protection
C. Some Evidence of the GPT Conjecture
In this section, we will reflect on our conjecture through
several pieces of evidence. To verify the rationality of our
conjecture, we conduct an empirical study on 32 representative
works, and show the results in Table I. Three columns (P1,
P2 and P3) in the table display three properties respec-
tively as we define in Section III-A. P1 column denotes
the granularity—check-mark indicates a fine-grained
scheme whileas cross-mark represents a coase-grained
3
TABLE I: Reflection of GPT conjecture in 32 control-flow
integrity schemes.
Schemes P11 P2 P3
CFIXX [34] ✗ 4.98% ✓
REINS [35] ✗ 2.40% ✓
vfGuard [27] ✗ 18.30% ✓
VTV [28] ✗ 9.60% ✓
LLVM-CFI [36] ✗ 1.10% ✓
VTI [37] ✗ 0.50% ✓
CFGuard [38] ✗ 2.30% ✓
IFCC [28] ✗ -0.30% ✓
ROPecker [39] ✗ 2.60% ✓
bin-CFI [40] ✗ 8.50% ✓
ROPGuard [41] ✗ 0.48% ✓
SafeDispatch [29] ✗ 2.00% ✓
CCFIR [42] ✗ 2.08% ✓
kBouncer [43] ✗ 4.00% ✓
OCFI [44] ✗ 4.70% ✓
CFIMon [45] ✗ 6.10% ✓
τCFI [46] ✗ 2.89% ✓
HCIC [25] ✗ 0.95% ✓
RAGuard [47] ✗ 1.86% ✓
HyperSafe [48] ✗ 5.00% ✓
BinCC [48] ✗ 4.00% ✓
CCFI [24] ✗ 52.00% ✓
KCOFI [49] ✗ 13.00% ✓
Original CFI [50] ✓ 16.00% ✓
Lockdown [51] ✓ 20.00% ✓
MCFI [20] ✓ 5.00% & 4GB ✓
piCFI [13] ✓ 3.20% & 4GB ✓
GRIFFIN [23] H2 ✓ 11.90% ✗
PITTYPAT [22] P, H ✓ 12.73% ✗
ECFI [52] ✓ 1.50% ✗
µCFI [21] C, H ✓ 10.00% ✗
PathArmor [14] C ✓ 3.00% ✗
1 If a CFI scheme supports different security levels, e.g. having both
coase-grained and fine-grained versions, we focus on its most
secure version.
2 ‘H’, ‘P’ and ‘C’ denote hardware-assisted CFI scheme, path sensitive CFI scheme,
and context sensitive CFI scheme, respectively.
scheme. P2 column shows the performance overheads which
are reported in corresponding papers. Note that we pre-
fer evaluation results which are based on SPEC CPU
R©2006
benchmarks [53]. P3 column labels whether a CFI scheme
provides preventive protection. We label the data
in each column with red color when it fails to meet the
requirement defined in the conjecture.
Evidence i. It can be clearly seen in Table I that all
CFI schemes we surveyed comply with our conjecture—no
CFI schemes can achieve all three properties. Also,
some of unsophisticated schemes, such as PITTYPAT [22]
and GRIFFIN [23], only achieve one properity, i.e., fine
granularity.
Evidence ii. MCFI [20] and piCFI developed by Niu, et al.
achieve fine granularity with acceptable runtime over-
heads, i.e., 3.2% and 5.0%, respectively. However, researchers
did not realize that their better runtime overhead is achieved
through sacrificing their space performance. Even though they
did not report their space overhead in their paper explicitly,
we can infer it in a reasonable manner.
As discussed in Section II-2, both of two schemes adopt
two tables, namely Bary and Tary, to support their runtime
checking. Accordingly, 1GB/4GB memory space on x86-32
and x86-64 operating system, respectively, need to be reserved
in each process for the tables. As stated by the author, “On
x86-32, memory segmentation is used, as in NaCl [54]. A
1GB segment is reserved for running the application code and
another 1GB segment is reserved for the table region. x86-
64, however, does not support memory segmentation. Instead,
memory writes are instrumented so that they are restricted to
the [0, 4GB) memory region. Another 4GB memory region is
reserved for tables.” In view of the size of memory consump-
tion of typical programs (mostly less than 1GB [53]), their
space overhead has already reached 100% except for code
bloat caused by extra no-op instructions inserted to enforce
four-byte alignment on indirect-branch targets.
Evidence iii. GRIFFIN [23] is a hardware-assisted CFI,
which leverages Intel PT to record control-flow of a moni-
tored program. It supports multiple types of CFI policies to
enable flexible trade-offs between security and performance.
The fine-grained scheme incures an average of 11.9%
overhead. It leverages idle cores on a multi-core system
for security checking by having multiple worker threads to
check runtime control-flow simultaneously. In most of the
time, it performs non-blocking checking which analyzes trace
buffer of Intel PT whenever it becomes full; In a few cases
when security-sensitive system calls are invoked, it performs
blocking checking which stops the target thread until all the
control transfers in the buffer have been checked. It can only
provide the detective protection for software accord-
ing to Definition 3. This case indicates that GPT conjecture is
applicable to hardware-assisted CFI schemes.
Evidence iv. PITTYPAT [22], µCFI [21] and PathAr-
mor [14] are path/context sensitive CFI schemes which adopt
path-sensitive or context-sensitive analysis to generate their
CFG. However, path-sensitive and context-sensitive analysis
is generally considered to be more time-consuming and space-
consuming than insensitive analysis [19]. We find that all three
CFI schemes adopt two common features: hard-assisted
branch recording and lazy checking. Specifically,
PITTYPAT and µCFI employ Intel PT—a brand new hardware
feature in Intel CPUs—to efficiently record conditional and
indirect branches taken by a program at runtime while PathAr-
mor adopts Last Branch Record (LBR) registers available in
Intel processors to monitor recently exercised control-flow
transfers in an efficient way. Their control-flow checking is
achieved through accompanying threads. This case indicates
that both path-sensitive and context-sensitive CFI schemes
conform to the claim of GPT conjecture.
REMARK 4. Our observations indicate that the GPT conjec-
ture is universally applicable in all kinds of scenarios. Further,
four pieces of evidence are not meant to be exhaustive and
more evidence are easy to find.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GPT CONJECTURE
In this section, we will focus on answering Question ➌:
how can GPT conjecture inspire future research?
First of all, GPT conjecture illustrates the inherent trade-
offs of three important properties (fine granularity,
acceptable performance, and preventive
protection) in CFI schemes. It helps researchers to
have a deeper understanding of the nature of CFI based
protection. Accordingly, future researchers should make a
necessary sacrifice before designing new CFI schemes. In the
broader context, GPT conjecture provides insights into the
feasible design space for CFI schemes, shedding some light
on the manner in which algorithm designers and software
engineers have circumvented the conjecture.
Second, for decades, security researchers have been fo-
cused on CFI scheme’s runtime performance and made their
best effort to improve it. Evidence ii shows that in some
cases, better runtime performance is achieved by sacrificing
its space performance. Just as Gerhard states, “For some
problems, we can reach an improved time complexity, but it
seems that we have to pay for this with an exponential space
complexity” [55]. Therefore, performance evaluation in future
research should not merely be limited to runtime performance
and researchers should have a more comprehensive evaluation
of their schemes.
Third, Evidence iii that even powerful hardware support
cannot eliminate the runtime overhead of Just-In-Time
CFI schemes to an acceptable level, which implies that the
challenge in the implementation of CFI cannot be solved
only through engineering efforts, instead, it may relate to
computational complexity theory [56]. In a broader sense, we
observe that indirect branching poses not only challenge in
the security field, but also challenges to many others: precise
pointer analysis is NP-hard [57]; indirect branch prediction is a
performance-limiting factor for current computer systems [58].
Hence, GPT conjecture implies the complexity of the CFI
problem, which deserves to be investigated through theoretical
methods.
At last, despite the inspiring implications that Gpt con-
jecture gives to us, we admit that we still cannot prove the
conjecture at this time.
V. CONCLUSION
Control-flow integrity is a popular defence technique for
detecting and defeating control-flow hijacking attacks. Since
its inception in the decade, researchers have put great ef-
forts to explore its potential regarding security, performance,
compatibility and so on. Even though performance/security
trade-off is widely noticed in CFI research, we observe that
not every CFI scheme is subject to it. In this paper, we
propose the GPT conjecture to illustrate the general trade-offs
in CFI schemes. The conjecture points out the impossibility of
guaranteeing both fine granularity and acceptable
performance in a Just-In-Time CFI schemes. We have
verified the rationality of our conjecture based on an empirical
study on existing works. Even though we cannot prove the
conjecture at this time, we believe that GPT conjecture will
help researcher to have a deeper understanding of the nature
of CFI problem and it will direct future research in this area.
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